As two Asian giants sitting across the Himalayas, China and India sometimes have their differences due to the boundary question and geopolitical disputes. The border troops of these two countries confronted each other in May and engaged this June in the most serious border clash since the 1962 border conflict, leaving casualties on both sides. The border tensions, a result of accumulated old and new problems fueled by the profound changes in international and regional landscapes, take a toll on political trust, economic and trade cooperation, and national sentiments between the two countries. The border standoff and ongoing talks have simultaneously carried on since June. New changes keep emerging, threatening border stability and future relations between China and India.

Opportunism and adventurism have long existed in the strategic culture of India. The ups and downs of China-India relations in the past seven decades are rooted in India’s mixed attitudes toward China.

This year, considering the COVID-19 pandemic’s continuous impact on international security and the world economic situation, the negative side of India’s China policy gained the upper hand. The escalating China-U.S. competition and Washington’s wooing of India seem an endorsement to New Delhi that China is too occupied to deal with India, an opportunity for India to take advantage of. As a result, regardless of China’s concerns, India chose to build sensitive facilities in sensitive areas at a sensitive time, which triggered the border clash.

The Narendra Modi government adopts the strategy of “political retaliation, diplomatic counterattack, and economic punishment” toward China to cater to domestic nationalism following the border friction. India imposes more trade barriers and investment restrictions, cancels Chinese contracts, boycotts Chinese-developed apps and bans Chinese companies from bidding for big projects. All of these measures sour economic and trade cooperation between the two countries and dampen the enthusiasm of Chinese investors.

Some Indian media figures and policy strategists call on the Indian government to reset its China policy and build stronger bonds with the U.S., and even urge the Indian side to take military retaliation against China. Similar national sentiments were seen before the outbreak of the border conflict in 1962.

Back in the early 1960s, China faced a domestic economic plight. Moreover, it was contained by the U.S. and had a rift with the Soviet Union externally, so it made every effort to avoid armed conflicts on the western border. New Delhi, however, started a fight against China because its policymakers believed that a troubled China was afraid and unwilling to use force. Clearly, they were not as practical and sensible as Indian policymakers today.

On July 21, 2020, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar stated that “non-alignment” has somehow become an old concept today, but India will never be part of an alliance system. India is not a bystander in the international arena. It needs to take a more proactive stance on issues including connectivity, maritime security, anti-terrorism, and climate change to realize its own development as the world is rebalancing. He added that these goals cannot be achieved by India alone. India will not ally itself with the U.S., so building ties with the U.S. will not be a problem.

It is worth noting that Gourangalal Das, Joint Secretary (Americas) in India’s Ministry of External Affairs, has recently been appointed as the new representative to China’s Taiwan, a position lower than his high qualifications; while Baushuan Ger, the so-called “director general of the Department of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the Foreign Ministry” in Taiwan, has been appointed as Taiwan’s new representative to India. The two sides apparently had exchanged ideas in private before appointing two senior diplomats at the same time. Indian and Taiwanese media disclosed that Das is expected to focus on developing India-Taiwan economic and trade cooperation and the tripartite interactions with the U.S. and Taiwan, so as to attract more of Taiwan’s enterprises, especially those have invested in the mainland of China, to do business in India. This reflects possible adjustments of India’s China policy.